ParkingEye and the changing approach to automatic suspension

The 1 May 2026 decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Velindre University NHS Trust & Anor [2026] EWHC 1019 (TCC) is the first reported judgment under the Procurement Act 2023. It considers an application by an NHS Trust to lift the automatic suspension and, in doing so, provides early guidance on how the new regime may operate. 

It is significant not only as the first decision under the Act, but also because it suggests that in some cases, it may now be easier for bidders to maintain the automatic suspension, preventing the contracting authority from entering into the contract.  

This marks a shift from the position under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (the “PCR”). Under that regime, it was often difficult for bidders to resist an application to lift the automatic suspension, meaning contracting authorities were frequently able to proceed to contract award without significant delay, leaving bidders with only a remedy in damages. That is no longer a safe assumption for awarding authorities.  

The judgment highlights a number of practical points for contracting authorities which are worth bearing in mind when running procurements and responding to challenges:  

• This is not simply the old “American Cyanamid” approach under a new label. Under the PCR, applications to lift suspension were generally assessed using interim injunction principles, with the adequacy of damages often carrying significant weight; the court made clear that the section 102 test under the Procurement Act is materially different in structure and effect. Now, damages are just one factor within “the interests of suppliers” under s.102(2)(b), and will not carry the same weight on their own. 

• Public interest plays a key role. The judge indicated that, in general, the public interest in the lawful award of a contract will tend to favour maintaining the suspension. That is a clear shift from the previous regime. 

• Authorities need a persuasive case to succeed in lifting the suspension. It will not be enough to rely on general service delivery or commercial inconvenience. The court indicated it will be looking for genuinely weighty factors in the public interest, for example, risks to critical services such as defence or security. Assertions about serious consequences must be properly evidenced as the court will be alert to overstatements. Summary judgment or strike out applications may also prove useful where they enable the authority to demonstrate weaknesses in the bidder’s underlying claim when seeking to lift the suspension. 

• The outcome was fact sensitive. This case concerned a relatively non‑critical service and the lifting of the suspension is determined on the factual matrix.  Cases involving genuinely urgent or high‑risk services may well be treated differently.  

• Delay can undermine your position. If the procurement itself has been delayed, or there has been no urgency in progressing the litigation, it is harder for the contracting authority to argue that the contract must be entered into immediately and the suspension lifted. It seems to us that a delay in provision of disclosure may also be a relevant consideration of the court. 

• Incumbents may have an advantage. Where the claimant is already delivering the service, maintaining the suspension may simply preserve the status quo, which the court may be slow to disturb. 

Where does that leave contracting authorities? 

The practical position appears to be shifting. Contracting authorities can no longer safely assume that an automatic suspension will likely be lifted if they apply for it. Instead, the risk that a suspension may be maintained and the resulting delay to contract award should be factored in from the outset. Authorities should also consider, at an early stage, how any genuinely compelling public interest in proceeding to award could be evidenced if challenged.